Dear NRC member,

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has requested that the NRC inform our members of recently issued recommendations endorsing the safety benefits of all collision-avoidance systems on maintenance machines and people-detection systems on machines with moveable extenuations (R-25-10). This information is the result of the NTSB’s report issued on August 4, 2025, entitled Middlesex Corporation Employee Fatality on Housatonic Railroad Company-Operated Line, Great Barrington, Massachusetts, August 4, 2023, NTSB/RIR-25-11.

Complete NTSB Report – Review the details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation here.

Summary of the Incident - A Middlesex Corporation tie drilling machine operator was making a northbound reverse movement along the Berkshire (rail) Line when the roadway maintenance machine struck and killed another Middlesex employee who was operating a leaf blower on the same track. The Massachusetts Department of Transportation, the owner of the Berkshire Line, had contracted Middlesex to perform track improvements. The Housatonic Railroad Company (HRRC) operates freight railroad services on the line and had provided a roadway-worker-in-charge (RWIC) to oversee safety for the track improvement work.

NTSB Findings & Recommendations – – The NTSB asked the NRC to communicate the following information to its members:

1. Emphasize the NTSB report findings and urge members to inform their employees of the circumstances of this accident, the importance of thorough job briefings with railroad contractors, and the requirement to communicate on-track activities and movements with the RWIC. (R-25-11).
2. Detail the safety benefits of equipping roadway maintenance machines (RMMs) with collision avoidance systems and, when RMMs have movable extensions, a people detection system that alerts operators of nearby workers. (R-25-10).
3. Regarding recommendation R-25-11, the NTSB concluded that the probable cause of the accident was the driller operator’s failure to actively observe that the driller’s path of travel was clear. The machine was not equipped with a redundant safety system, such as collision avoidance, thereby the lapse in the driller operator’s attention resulted in severe consequences.
4. The NTSB also found that the RWIC’s lack of awareness of daily tasking and a lack of communication between the RWIC and the work group was a contributing cause of the accident.

In response to NTSB recommendation R-25-11, the NRC provides the following.

• This fatality may have been prevented with proper communication during the Job Safety Briefing (JSB) performed by the Railway Worker in Charge (RWIC) – who oversees all activities, including RMM on-track operations. The RWIC is responsible for controlling work groups and RMM access to the working limits.
• A proper job briefing and debriefing would have informed both parties of all of the equipment and ground labor forces jobs, the location of work, type of protection, and how the three parties would communicate if they were moving down the track.
• When the RMMO equipment was repaired and ready to return to work, another job briefing should have been conducted between the RWIC and the operator. The RWIC should have informed the operator that there were men on the ground and to travel at restricted speed until he made contact with the group on the ground. The RWIC then should have had a job briefing with the ground force letting them know they had moving equipment heading their way and to be ready to clear the track.

Regarding NTSB recommendation R-25-10, the NRC has communicated with its members on this topic. Some contractors are utilizing collision detection technology such as back-up cameras and other object detection systems. However, collision avoidance systems that can detect objects and automatically stop an RMM without operator interface, have not been readily available to be utilized by railroad contractors. Members of the NRC and the industry on whole recognize that it will be difficult to add the recommended technology enhancements to all RMM equipment in a short-term application, especially for smaller contractors that primarily stay on Industry track or short-line settings, although that could become a long-term recommendation.

Thank you to members of the NRC Safety Committee, led by Chairperson Erika Bruhnke, for their assistance in developing this response.

If you have questions about these findings or recommendations, please contact the NRC atinfo@nrcma.org.

Sincerely,

Ashley Wieland
President
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association (NRC)