Dear NRC member,

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has requested that the NRC inform our members of recently issued recommendations endorsing the safety benefits of all collision-avoidance systems on maintenance machines and people-detection systems on machines with moveable extenuations (R-25-10). This information is the result of the NTSB’s report issued on August 4, 2025, entitled Middlesex Corporation Employee Fatality on Housatonic Railroad Company-Operated Line, Great Barrington, Massachusetts, August 4, 2023, NTSB/RIR-25-11.

Complete NTSB Report – Review the details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation here.

Summary of the Incident - A Middlesex Corporation tie drilling machine operator was making a northbound reverse movement along the Berkshire (rail) Line when the roadway maintenance machine struck and killed another Middlesex employee who was operating a leaf blower on the same track. The Massachusetts Department of Transportation, the owner of the Berkshire Line, had contracted Middlesex to perform track improvements. The Housatonic Railroad Company (HRRC) operates freight railroad services on the line and had provided a roadway-worker-in-charge (RWIC) to oversee safety for the track improvement work.

NTSB Findings & Recommendations– The NTSB asked the NRC to communicate the following information to our members and urge them to inform their employees of the circumstances of this accident,

1) Stress the importance of thorough job safety briefings,

2) Review the requirement to communicate on-track activities and movements with the roadway worker-in-charge. (R-25-11).

3) Emphasize these report findings:

• This fatality could have been prevented with proper communication during the Job Safety Briefing (JSB) performed by the Railway Worker in Charge(RWIC) – who is in charge of all activities, including the railroad maintenance machine operations (RMMO.) The RWIC is responsible for the entire working limits ,including the working groups.
• ‍‍A proper job briefing and debriefing would have informed both parties of all of the equipment and ground labor forces jobs, the location of work, type of protection, and how the three parties would communicate if they were moving down the track.
• When the RMMO equipment was repaired and ready to return to work, another job briefing should have been conducted between the RWIC and the operator. The RWIC should have informed the operator that there were men on the ground and to travel at restricted speed until he made contact with the group on the ground .The RWIC then should have had a job briefing with the ground force letting them know they had moving equipment heading their way and to be ready to clear the track.
• The industry recognizes that it will be difficult to add the recommended technology enhancements to all RMMO equipment in a short-term application, especially for smaller contractors that primarily stay on Industry track or short-line settings, although that could become a long-term recommendation.  

Thank you to members of the NRC Safety Committee, led by Chairperson Erika Bruhnke, for their assistance in developing this response.

If you have questions about these findings or recommendations, please contact the NRC atinfo@nrcma.org.

Sincerely,

Ashley Wieland
President
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association (NRC)